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EXPOSING INCOMPETENCY OF WITNESSES
The party calling a witness may already have exposed facts
which make him incompetent to testify. Thus when the law made
a party generally incompetent to testify for himself, the fact
that he appeared on the record as such party was a sufficient
disclosure of his incompetency.
A party to the suit may
have called witness A whose testimony reveals the fact that
X is interested with the party in the subject of the action.
Probably if X is then called by that party the opposing party
may object, on the ground of interest, that X is disqualified to
testify, and A's testimony will be sufficient evidence of that
interest.2
PRESUMPTIVE INCOMPETENCY.

When a witness is offered, if the opposite party is aware of
facts which make him incompetent, he should object to the witness' being sworn. But objection is not enough. It must be
sustained by evidence. The objection alone does not put on
the party offering the witness, the necessity of showing'him
competent. The duty of showing the facts which make incompetent, lies on the objector ". Hence if the evidence of the disqualifying facts, e.g., interest in the suit, leaves the existence of
that interest uncertain, and would not justify cither court or jury

'Plank Road Co. v. Thomas 2o Pa. 91.
'Steamboat Dictator v. Heath, 56 Pa. 29o. The witness was in fact
admitted, probably because the testimony of the prior witness did not
sufficiently clearly show that he was interested.
3
Juniata Bank v. Beale, I W. & S. 227; Hartman v. Ins. Co. 21 Pa. 466,
Chase v. Goldsborough, 2 Phila. 179; Stone's Appeal, I Mona. 710.
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in affirming it, the witness must be received. The evidence being
that the consideration of a note may have been a partnership account, will not warrant the inference that it was so and if the
incompetency depends on its being so, the witness will be received4 . If the incompetency of the witness'depends on the
death of her husband after his father, the objecting party must
make it appear that the death occurred after that of the father5 .
" If the fact on which [the incompetency] rests be doubtful,
the witness is heard' 6.The witness is not excluded by the pleadings of the parties but by facts shown to the Court by which it
is made to appear that he is interested in the event of the suit.
PRESUMPTION OF CONTINUANCE OF INCOMPETENCY.

If a disqualifying relation or state is shown to have existed before the time of giving the testimony, it will be presumed to continue down to that time. It must be shown to have
been removed, in order to authorize 'the testimony of the witness. If, e.g, witness A, called for the plaintiff is shown once
to have had an interest in the thing sued for, so that, should
the plaintiff recover, he would have had a right to sue the
plaintiff for a share of it he will be assumed at the trial,
still to have it, unless it is shown to have been ended by a release or other satisfactory evidence.
RELEASES, ETC., TO RESTORE COMPETENCY.

The interest in the subject matter of the suit, once existing,
may be terminated before the giving of the testimony by assignment, release, etc. The 6th section of the act of May 23d, 1887,
recognizes this method of restoring competency. Any person
who is incompetent under clause (e) of section 5 by reason of
interest, shall "become fully competent for either party, by a
release or extinguishment in good faith of his interest, upon
which good faith the trial judge shall decide as a preliminary
question."
A release of his interest in the land by the witness
to a third person, made at the bar during the trial, was held
insufficient to extinguish his interest in the success of the defendant for whom he was offered and under whom he was in
4
Smith v. Moore, z Phila.
T
Pringle v. Pringle, 59 Pa.
6

xi4.
281.
Hartman v. Ins. Co. 21 Pa. 466; Martin.v. Jones, 6 Pa. 82.
'Gillespie v.rGoddard, i Pittsb. 3o6 [S. C.]
8Mifflin v. Bingham, i DalI. 272.
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possession. A recovery by the defendant would shelter his possion, notwithstanding the release9 .
WHEN DISQUALIFYING FACT MUST EXIST.

It is not enough that the disqualifying fact existed before
the time of giving the evidence, although, as we have seen, from
its prior existence may be inferred its continuance, in the absence of evidence of cessation; nor is it enough that a fact began
to exist, after the delivery of the testimony which, had it existed
at the time of delivery would have disqualified the witness. Thus
though death of the opposite party B would have rendered
the surviving party A incompetent had it preceded A's testimony,
it will not, occurring after the giving of that testimony, retroact
upon it and make it incompetent. If after A has testified in
chief and B has had abundant opportunity to cross-examine him,
B, not having cross-examined him, dies, A's testimony given
in the examination in chief will not be stricken out". So, evidence given by a witness before the party against whom he is
testifying is declared a lunatic, will not be stricken out or disregarded, because later, the latter party is declared to be a
lunatic".
INCOMPETENCY KNOWN BEFORE TESTIMQNY.

The disqualifying facts may be known when the witness is
offered. The party to be adversely affected by that testimony,
should object to his being sworn as a witness. But as has been
said, objection is not enough. It must be supported by evidence.
The opposing party must then present this evidence. He may
risk getting it from the proposed witness, and may cause him to
be sworn, not to testify as to the facts at issue between the parties,
but as to the facts upon which his capacity as a witness depends 2 .
The witness when so swdrn, is said to be sworn on the voir dire.
"A witness is said to be examined on the voir dirc when he is
sworn and examined in regard to facts touching his competency
to testify as a witness in the case on trial. This is usually done
before the witness is sworn in chief" etc."1 If the witness thus
preliminarily sworn, at the instance, not of the party who pro9

Vincent v. Huff, 4 S. & R. 298.
"°Hays'
Appeal, 91 Pa. 265.
11
Stone's Appeal, i Mon. 710.
"Vincent v. Huff, 4 S. & R. 298.
u3o Am. & Eng. Encyc. 973.
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poses to examine him in chief, but of the opposite party, admits
the disqualifying facts, his admission is accepted as true, and he
is rejected' 4 . But, the testimony of the witness may leave uncertain whether he is disqualified or not. He cannot be rejected
on such testimony. Something more must appear. The witness' statement that a certain fact or relation may exist does not
justify the conclusion that it does exist". The proposing party
has a right after the objecting party has questioned the witness
upon the vir dire, to examine him more fully upon the matter
of his interest or other disqualifying circumstance. What he
says in this further examination must be combined with what he
says in reply to the objector's questions, in determining his competency. In Blackstock v. Leidy'6 suit was brought for the price
of stores furnished for a steamboat, against three persons, one
of whom was Hill, as owners. At the trial, Hill denied his coownership. If co-owner he became such by a transfer from
Hunter to Beck. It was alleged that Beck bought for Hill.
Beck, offered by the plaintiff, was objected to as interested. The
defendant examined him on the z'oir dire. He said, "Hunter executed a deed of conveyance to me for part of this boat. It is
registered in the Custom House made before the month of NoThe plaintiff then continued the examination
vember, 1849-."
upon this subject, and he added " I had no interest in my own
right; the asignment to me was not made for my benefit. I
never claimed any interest under it. I have no interest in this
."
suit. The transfer was made to me at the instance of The Court overruled the objection to his competency. Approving, Black, C. J. remarks: "When called by the plaintiff,
the defendants to sustain the objection, swore him on his voir
dire, and the fact which they extracted from him would have
rendered him incompetent without a further explanation. But
the party who called him took up the examination, and in reply
to their inquiries he stated what showed that he had no interest.
All he said must be taken together."
IMPHACHING OTHERWISE THAN BY VOIR DIRE.

The objecting party may not choose to sustain his objection by the testimony of the witness whose admission he opposes.
He then resorts to other evidence. May he prove that the wit-

"Martin v. Jones, 6iPa. 8:.

"5Smith v. Moore, 2 Phila. 14.
'6 [9 Pa. 335-
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ness has out of court and before the trial, admitted the existence of disqualifying facts? It appears that he may not. " It
is not possible" says Woodward J. "for a witness to disqualify
himself and deprive a party of his testimony by his mere declarations of an interest. If it were a party could never be sure
of his witness. A word spoken by him, or imputed to him
whether spoken or not, would shut his mouth from testifying,
for the rule is that if one party has proved by testimony aliunde
that a witness is interested, the other cannot offer the witness'
own oath to show that he has no interest". A fortiori,the silence
of the proposed witness when on a former occasion some one
in his presence, made statements of facts, which if true, would
disqualify him, could not be shown as a tacit admission of the
truth of these statements, in order to exclude him 8 . Proof of
admissions out of court, of the party who calls the witness that
that witness is interested or otherwise disqualified will be receivable as evidence of his disqualification".
IMPEACHMENT BY DEED.

The witness may be shown to be interested in the subject
matter of an ejectment by a conveyance to him. In Carmalt v.
Pratt" P being called as a witness, objection was made that he
was interested. A witness proved that he saw in P's possession
a deed to him from the plaintiff [ejectment] and that P told him
that he had purchased the land from plaintiff. The rejection
on this evidence, of P was approved by the supreme court,
which, admitting that a witness' statements out of court cannot
be used to prove disqualifying facts, asserted that the deed was
sufficient evidence of the interest, and that the testimony of the
impeaching witness as to the existence and import of the deed
was sufficient, to prove its existence and import although the
deed itself would have been the best evidence. " It cannot be
expected," says Rogers J, "that a party, in anticipation that
17Erisman v. Walters, 26 Pa. 467.
"'Erisman v. Walters 26 Pa. 467; Pollock v. Gillespie, 2 Y 129; Long v.
Baillie, 4 S. & R. 227; Carmalt v. Platt, 7 W. 318- Crosley v. Yetter, 4
Phila. 345. Evidence of the witness' declarations concerning his want of
religious belief was given, in Quinn v. Crowell, 4 Wh. 334.
Pa. 321; Gor"9Carmalt v. Platt, 7 W. 3,8; Walters v. Coursin, i9.
don v. Bowers, 16 Pa. 226. Haynes v. Hunsicker, 26 Pa. 58. In some of
these cases the declaration both of the party and the witnesses as to a
partnership between them, were received,
207 W. 38.
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an interested witness will be offered, will at all times be prepared with the best evidence to show his incompetency; hence
other and inferior evidence may be sufficient to exclude a
witness. Here although the deed was not produced, nor notice
given to produce it, yet its existence was proved by a person
who saw it.
IMPEACHMENT BY OTHER EVIDENCE.

A note, payable to A, with an assignment on the back of it,
dated Jan. 22d, 1843, to B, and another assignment from B
to C, dated Oct. 12th, 1843, may be used to show, when C is
offered as a witness to defeat an attachment of the debt in A's
hands by D, by proving the assignment to B, prior to the service of the attachment (on Jan. 23d, 1843) that C is interested
as assignee from B22.
BY PAROL EVIDENCE.

The impeaching evidence may be oral; e. g. the alleged interest of the witness offered by the plaintiff is that he is a partner with the plaintiff. In such a case, witnesses may testify that
both the plaintiff and the proposed witness had declared to them
that they were partners2 In ejectment, the evidence to show
the interest of the witness called for the defendant, was that
after a former recovery by the defendant, he received the possession from the sheriff as the defendant's agent, that he has
been in possession ever since and that he has sometimes claimed
the land as his own. Since a recovery by the present plaintiff
would result in his being put out of possession, he was disqualfled for interest" .
WITNESS' SELF-EXONERATION CONCLUSIVE.

If the witness, interrogated by the opposing party on the
voir dire distinctly denies the interest or other disqualifying fact,
he must be admitted"'. Evidence in contradiction will not be
2

'Disqualification may be shown, said McKean C. J., by evidence "ei-

ther 2parol or written."-Mifflin v. Bingham, i Dall. 272.
Anderson v. Young 21 Pa. 443.-In C's deposition, which the Court

rejected, he stated that the assignment to him passed no interest to him;
that it was made merely to enable him to collect the money for B.
4Gordon v. Bowers, i6 Pa., 226; Cf. Lyon v. Daniels, 14 Pa. 197.-The
fact of interest of a witness must appear otherwise than by the oath of the
opposing party; Anspach v. Thompson Q3 Am. L. Reg. 362.
24
Vincent v, Huff, 4 S. & R. 298.
2Schnader v. Schnader, 26 Pa. 384.
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received. He may admit that he had once been a stockholder
in the defendant corporation; but may say that he has ceased
to be such. He will be admitted as a witness for the defendant?6 .
BLENDING OF BOTH METHODS OF IMPEACHMENT.

The party who opposes the reception of the testimony of a
witness may, as we have seen, expose the facts which make him
incompetent by questioning him on the voir dire, or by evidence aliunde' . But after using one of these methods he cannot use the other. He may for example, use evidence alunde.
He cannot supplement this by evidence extracted by the voir
dire. Having, e. g. put in a bond of indemnity, to show that
the witness is interested, but on which the Court fails to find a
liability of the witness, the objector may not examine him upon
his voir dire . Or he may resort to the voir dire to prove the
witness interested. He could then resort to no other evidence.
Objecting that the witness. was a partner with the party calling
him, e. g. the opposite party could not, after examining him on
the voir direand receiving from him a denial of thepartnership,
call other witnesses to prove that he was a partner 1 . But if the
witness' answer on the voir direleaves uncertain the existence of
disqualifying facts they may be found by other evidence. In a
suit against a sheriff for not executing a writ of fieri facds, P,
a surety in a bond given to the sheriff by the claimant of the
property (which it is alleged the sheriff ought to have levied on
and sold) to indemnify him for not levying upon it, when
examined by the plaintiff on his voir dire said that "he did not
know whether he was bail to the sheriff or not; he was not positive and did not recollect executing the bond." It was proper
to allow the plaintiff, who opposed the calling of P, as a witness, to prove by other evidence that P was a party to the bond,
6
Hartman
2

v. Keys. Ins. Co., 21 Pa. 466.
The party offering has a right to examine the witness. If stating to
the court his desire to examine the Court tells the party "you may pro
ceed to argue the offer and objections, assuming for the. present that the
facts stated in your objections are true" and then, without hearing evidence
as to those facts, overrules the objection, and the alleged facts would have
constituted a disqualification, the court commits an error; Murphy v. Murphy, 24 Super 547.
8Mifflin v. Bingham, 1 Dall. 272; Carmalt v. Platt, 7 W. 3x8; Anderson
v. Young, 21 Pa. 443; Crosley v. Yetter, 4 Phil. 345.
29Peiffer v. Lytle, 58 Pa. 386.
•Vincent v. Huff, 4 S. & R. 298, Schnader v. Schnader, 26 Pa. 384.
SlSchnader v. Schnader, 26 Pa. 384.
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and therefore interested. The court hearing this evidetice
properly excluded him32 . Crist being offered as a witness by
the defendant in an action on a recognizance given in the Orphans' Court, was examined by the plaintiff on the voir dire,
but left uncertain whether he was interested in the defeat of the
action or not. The Court properly allowed the .plaintiff to put
in evidence two deeds which tentled to show that he was interested, and properly excluded him33 .
SUSTAINING

COMPETENCY.

The party opposing the admission of the witness determines
by the method of investigation he adopts the mode in which his
competency is to be sustained. If he selects the voir dire, the
proposing party must abide by the answers which the offered
witness makes. All he can do is to supplement the interrogations
of the objector by interrogations of his own, designed to bring
out more fully, distinctly and accurately the facts.
The
opposing party may resort to other evidence than that of the
offered witness himself. The interest of the witness being alleged to consist in the fact that he is a partner of the party calling him, the objector may call witnesses to prove facts from
which the partnership may be inferred, e. g. declarations from
both the plaintiff and the witness that they were partners. The
plaintiff may then call witnesses to prove that though residing in the village where the plaintiff carries on business they
never heard of a partnership34 . But the proponent cannot rebut
the evidence aliunde, furnished by the objector by putting the
witness on his voir dire. Only the objector can initiate the exemination of the witness5. The objector contends that the witness is unworthy to be believed, because of interest or some
other disqualifying fact. He does not give him credit by questioning him on the voir dire. The proposing party cannot therefore obtain from him-as yet unworthy of credit-the facts which
32

Shannon v. Commonwealth. 8 S. & R. 444.
v. Galbraith, 6 W. 112.
3*Gordon v. Bowers, 16 Pa: 226. A memorandum book of the plaintiff's was likewise put in evidence upon the question of a partnership with
the witness.
3
'Galbraith

• Vincent v, Huff, 4 S. & R. 298; Erisman y. Walters 26 Pa. 467. Cf.

Quinn v. Crowell 4 Wh. 334. The witness being apparently assignee of a
note in suit, and therefore incompetent, cannot testify that he was a merely
nominal assignee. Anderson v. Young 21 Pa. 443.
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prove him to be worthy of credit 6 . The proposing party cannot rely both on evidence aliunde, tending to deny the interest,
and on the voir dire, and this principle must be observed even
in the case in which the court submits to the jury the evidence
of facts bearing on competency. In Gordon v. Bowers " a witness offered by the plaintiff was objected to as being a partner
The defendant showed alizunde facts tending to
with him.
establish the partnership. Then the plaintiff proved facts tending to disprove it. The Court allowed the witness to testify but
submitted to the jury the question of partnership. It was error
to allow the plaintiff to ask the witness whether he had any interest in the event of the suit. When the question of competency is tried by the court, the proponent cannot fortify the evidence of exemption from incompetency, by the testimony of the
witness himself. "Conceding this", says Rogers, J. "it may
be inquired what reason, if any, can be assigned, why he should
be at liberty to testify before the jury when substituted to try
the same fact in place of the court. It may be asked, ought not
the latter to be bound by the same rules as the former? Why
should there be any difference in this respect, between the court
and jury, when performing the same office? That the rules of
evidence which it is important to preserve should be relaxed
before the latter tribunal, seems to be reversing the order of
But, if the objecting party chooses to ask the witness
things."
after he has been allowed to testify subject to the ultimate decision of the jury, concerning his interest, he cannot complain
if the witness distinctly denies any interest. "The plaintiff"
says Knox J. "could not have disproved the partnership by the
witness'. but when the defendant asked the question, the answer was evidence against him 9 .
OBJECTION BASED ON DEFECT OF RELIGION.

In Quinn v. Crowell both evidence aliunde and that of the
witness himself, were heard, on the subject of his religious disqualification. The defendant offered H as a witness. He was
objected to by the plaintiff, as wanting a proper religious belief,
3

1Cf. Griffith v. Reford, 1 R. 196; Thomas v. Brady, 10 Pa. 164.
3116 Pa. 226.
sThe objector had relied on evidence aliunde.
39 Haynes v. Hunsicker, 26 Pa. 58.
404 Wh. 334. Cf. Pennsylvania Law of Witnesses; p. 4:3.
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and witnesses were offered to prove the defect. The defendant
insisted that the witness should first be heard on the voir dire.
The court did not take this view. The plaintiff proved declarations of H showing a want of religious belief. The defendant
then offered witnesses who testified to recent declarations of
belief. H was then himself called (by whom does not appear;
probably by the defendant) and he swore that he believed in the
existence of a deity and a future state of rewards and punishments. H was then allowed to testify in chief. The judgment
having gone for the plaintiff, notwithstanding, it was affirmed,
Gibson C. J. denying the right to appeal with respect to preliminary evidence where the evidence in chief was properly admitted, and asserting that, even if the witness should have been.
heard before other evidence in regard to his religious belief,
yet, as he was in the end admitted, no error was committed
and intimating that it was improper for the defendant to examine the witness as to his own competency, since to do so assumed the fact in controversy, viz: his credibility. The act of
April 23d, 1909, P. L. 140, forbids the hearing of evidence in
any judical proceeding, concerning a witness' religious belief
for the purpose of affecting either his competency or his credibility.
PROPONENT PREPARES FOR ADMISSION OF WITNESSES.

The plaintiff, intending to offer X as a witness in a scire
facias to revive a judgment, X being marked on the record as a
transferee of the judgment, prepared the way by calling a witness to prove that X was a mere agent for Y, to whose use the
judgment was subsequently marked, and therefore was not interested in any way in a recovery by the plaintiff. X was then
received as a witness. Inter alia he testified that he never had
had any interest in the case. This was error. "A witness may
not remove an appearance of interest in him, by his own oath""'
In a suit by the endorsee against the endorser of a bill of exchange and a promisary note, X the drawer of the note who was
also the payee and endorser of the bill of exchange, could not
impeach the instruments if they were in the hands of a person
who was not a party to them originally. He could therefore
not testify that the plaintiff was a party to the original transaction (although its ultimate endorsee); i. e. that he was the
41

Banks v. Clegg, 14 Pa. 390.
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lender of the money and that the security was put into a negotiable form for the sake of convenience.
"If" says Gibson C,J.
"he might make way for his testimony in chief by taking his
case out of the rule which firimafacie furnishes a valid objection to it; he might as well testify in chief in the first instance;
for if he were competent for the one purpose, he would necessarily be so for the other. But the witness cannot open his lips
for any purpose whatever while an original objection to his
competency remains"". The incompetency of the witness resting on the ownership of a judgment by A, the apparent plaintiff, the defendant by his own testimony cannot deny that A
owned the judgment, and thus remove his disqualification 43 .
USE OF VOIR DIRE BY PROPONENT.

A witness called being apparently interested the party calling him may not examine him upon his voir dire in order to remove the apparent disability" or to show that a former interest
has ceased45 . A note made by A is payable to B. The money
in A's hands is attached, a foreign attachment, against B. Upoi
this note is an assignment to X purporting to have been made
the day before the service of the attachment. Then follows
an assignment from X to Y. Y is offered as a witness. He
is apparehtly interested in maintaining that the first assignment was made on the day on which it purports to have been
made. He cannot by his own testimony prove that the apparent
assignment to him was merely formal, intended to convey and
conveying no ownership of the money". No error is however
42
Griffith v. Reford, 1 R. 196. The objection to competency was supported by the appearance of the bill of exchange and note, on which the suit
was brought by the endorsee against the endorser. Cf. Gest v. Espy 2 W.
265. Harley v. Emerick, 1 Miles, 36.
43
Cake v. Cake, 162 Pa. 584.
4
1Gest v. Espy, 2 W. 265, Mishler v. Merkle, io Pa. 5o9; Miley v. Todd
17 Pa., soi; Thomas v. Brady, so Pa. 164; Quinn v. Crowell, 4 Wh. 334;
Harley v. Emerick, i Miles 36; Anderson v. Young 21 Pa. 443.
5Coal Co. v. Foster, 59 Pa. 365.
"Anderson v. Young, 21 Pa. 443. Agency is not ferse an interest. One
who appears to be agent, may by his own testimony prove that he has no
interest, says Porter J.in Roth v. Crissey, 30 Pa. 145. A note-broker had
sold a note to Crissey, the signature to which was forged. The action was
to recover the money from the person for whom the broker acted. The
plaintiff released him from personal liability to himself, and he was then
allowed to testify for him. "The policy of allowing an agent to purify
himself by his own oath of the suspicion of interest" says Porter J., "is too
firmly imbedded in our system to be upturned at this day"; but if there is
a mere "suspicion" of interest, his self-exonerating testimony would be unnecessary.
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committed for which there can be a reversal, if the examination
on the voir dire by the proponent was unnecessary to justify the
admission of the witness. Iii an ejectment, the plaintiff called
X as a witness. Objection was made that he had conveyed the
land to one under whom the defendant claimed and that he
could not impeach the title which he had thus conveyed. X
was allowed at the instance of the plaintiff to swear on the voir
dire, that he had bought the land for the person to whom he
afterwards conveyed it and never had more than the bare legal
title. X was then sworn in chief. Gibson J. held that even if
he had been the owner, he would have been competent to impeach the title which he conveyed. His testimony on the voir
dire was therefor unnecessary to justify the reception of the testimony in chief 7.
DEPOSITIONS.

At the taking of the deposition of a witness, before he is
sworn in chief, he may be examined upon the voir dire. If thus
examined , he shows himself qualified, the opposing party cannot
when the deposition is offered object to competency, and
offer witnesses to prove the deponent's interest, e.g. that he had
been a partner with the person for whom he had testified in
the deposition.
If the opposing party does not ob3ect to the
witness at the taking of the deposition, and does not examine
him on the zoir dire, but cross-examines him, he will not be precluded from objecting to the reception of the deposition if
it appears that the deponent was interested in the success of
the party for whom he testifies".
REFERRING THE QUESTION OF COMPMTENCY TO THE JURY.

The court passes generally upon the competency of witnesses. Since that competency depends upon the existence
of certain facts, the court must decide whether these facts
exist". If however, the facts are doubtful, the court may
properly, receiving the witness, submit the decision of them to
the jury, instructing them if they find interest or other disqualifying fact to disregard the testimony of the witness altogether; if, on the other hand, they find the disqualifying facts
"7 Brown v. Downing, 4 S. & R. 494.
I'Schnader v. Schnader 26 Pa. 384.
'"Mifflin v. Bingham, I Dall 272.
OThe Court rejected the witness, Lyon v. Daniels, 14 Pa. 197.
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not to exist to consider the testimony 1 . When the witness has an
interest in the success both of the plaintiff and of the defendant,
the court may admit him and tell the jury to discard his testimony if they find his interest in the plaintiff's success [for whom
he testifies] greater than his interest in that of the defendant52 .
In an action by A against the executor of B for services as
housekeeper the executor released his interest under the will,
and testified that A had received wages from the deceased. On
his cross-examination, it appeared that that he held large claims
against the estate, sufficient to absorb the whole of it, and more.
The couft submitted to the jury inter alia the competency of the
witness saying that if the estate was insolvent he was not competent and his testimony must be entirely disregarded 1 . Approving the supreme court says: "The court is not bound to
decide finally questions of fact on which competency depends;
but may ask the aid of the jury in determining them'"'" . When
the competency of a witness under the act of May 23d, 18876,
depends on his having been discharged of a prior interest by a
"release or extinguishment in good faith" of such interest, the
sixth section of that act directs that on his good faith "the
'trial judge shall decide as a preliminary question." When, a
witness being called, and objected to on the ground of interest,
an assignment of his interest to another in his father's personal
estate is offered the court, hears testimony on the question of
good faith. Having decided to admit and admitted the witness,
it is not required to submit to the jury the same question, e.g.
whether the assignment was made merely for the purpose of
rendering the assignee competent to testify. "It was not in" 1Hart v. Heilner, 3 R. 407; Martin v. Jones, 6 Pa. 82; Gordon v. Bowers, 16 Pa. 226; Hartman v. Ins. Co. 21 Pa. 466; Haynes v. Hunsicker, 26
Pa. 58; Chase v. Goldsborough, 1 Phila. 179; Coheck v. George, 2 Am. L.

J.258.

5
'Rees v. Livingston 41 Pa. 113; Guldin v. Guldin 97 Pa. 411. In Carmalt v. Platt 7 W. 318, it is intimated that even when the grounds for excluding a witness are so slight that the court should not exclude him, it may
allow the jury to do so. "I admit" says Rogers J."that the court should
not exclude a witness on slight grounds as it is better in a doubtful case of
interest, to refer the whole matter to the jury."
53
The theory was that as theplaintiff could not testify forherself neither
could any witness testify against her, whose intoeest would be promQted by
his testimony.
5
1Lee v. Welsh, 1 W. N. 453.
5Stewart's Purdon, 1498.
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tended," says Fell J. "by the provision [of the act of 1887] to
make the decision of the court subject to review by the jury,
and to change the long established rule of evidence that it is
the purpose of the court finally to decide preliminary questions
of fact upon which the admissibility of testimony depends.
Whether a release has been executed in good faith is a question
preliminary to the question of competency and as such it is decided as a preliminary question, but its decision is not preliminary merely to a second decision by the jury. The competency of a witness as to questions of both fact and law, is to be
determined by the court' "". But it does not follow that the court
would not have the power to submit the question to the jury
if it desired to do so.
DISQUALIFICATION DISCOVERED AFTER RECEPTION OF TESTIMONY

When the disqualifying facts do not appear until after the
delivery of a witness! testimony, the court may be requested to
withdraw, and may withdraw, the evidence from the jury. The
disqualifying facts may appear in the course of the cross-examination of the witness" or after his examination is fully ended,
by the testimony of some other witness, or by admissions of the
party. If, instead of asking the court to strike out the testimony, or to ask the jury to disregard it, the opposite party uses
it in the argument to the jury, he cannot complain that in its
charge to the jury, the court refuses to instruct them to disregard the testimony"
56

Semple v. Callery, 184 Pa. 95.
Coheck v. George, 2 Am. L. J. 258. The request may be to strike out
and the court may strike out. But the difference is more verbal than substantial. Rees v. Livingstcn, 41 Pa. 113.
-Steamboat Dictator v. Heath, 56 Pa. 290. If the remark of the witness relied on to show his interest is coupled with another which fully counterbalances it, both must be taken as parts of the same declaration. It is
for the jury to say which was correct, or whether both or either was or was
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not.
59
Rees v. Livingstone, 41 Pa. 113. In E. Pa. R. R. v. Schollenberger,
1 Walk. 401, the court told the jury that it was in doubt as to the competency of certain witnesses whose testimony had been received, and instructed them that, if they found a certain sale of stocks to have been absolute,
so that the witness was not interested, they should consider his testimony:
otherwise they should disregard it.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

MOOT COURT.
ADAM COOVER vs. FRANK PIERSON.
Sale. Sunday Contract. Subsequent Ratification.
STATEMEET OF FACTS.
Coover and Pierson met at church on Sunday. Coover offered to sell
the horse he had with him for $150 and take Pierson's note at 30 days.
Pierson agreed, executed and delivered the note. Coover was to
deliver the horse the following Tuesday, and did so. Pierson became
dissatisfied with the bargain and refused to pay the note at maturity.
Coover brings assumpsit declaring on the note, and also on a sale made
on Tuesday. The trial court allowed a recovery on the note, because it
was ratified on Tuesday.
GROVER for Plaintiff.
COOK for Defendant.
OPINION OF THF COURT.
MILLER, J. -In this case the court allowed a recovery on a note executed and delivered on Sunday in payment for a horse which was delivered on Tuesday. In passing on this case in review, let us first inquire
into the status of a contract made on Sunday.
The common law does not prohibit the making of contracts on Sunday, and accordingly such contracts have the same validity as if they had
been made on any other day, unless the common law has been abrogated
by a statutory prohibition of such contracts. That has been done in
Pennsylvania. Here, the law in that respect was changed by the act of
April 22, 1794.-3 Sm. L. 177, which, interalia, prohibits the performance
of worldly employment or business on Sunday, works of necessity and
charity only excepted, under pain of a penalty. A bare perusal of the
facts of this case furnishes ample justification for holding that this contract does not come within any of the exceptions enumerated in the act.
It is a well established principle of law that a contract to do an act
which is forbidden under a penalty, is void, and a citation of authorities
to fortify that proposition would be superfluous. In Mitchell v. Smith,
1 Binney 118, a contract for the purchase and sale of lands in Pennsylvania under the Connecticut title was held unlawful and void, although the
act of 1705, upon which the case hinged, neither expressly says so nor
contains any prohibitory clause, but merely inflicts a penalty upon the
offenders. The imposition of a penalty for the doing of an act was declared to imply a prohibition of the act. This was affirmed in 4 Dallas 270
and 4 Yeates 84.
But, what is more germane to this discussion, it is a well settled doctrine in Pennsylvania that contracts made on Sunday will not be enforced
by our courts, and no recovery thereon will be allowed. See Kepner v.
Keefer, 6 Watts 231. In that case, which was an action of debt upon a
note dated on Saturday, the defendant contended that the note was actually signed and delivered on Sunday. It was held that if there was
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sufficient evidence to support the defendant's contention, the plaintiff
could not recover.
If however, the contract is not fully consummated on Sunday, there
can be a recovery upon it, as for example where a note is executed on
Sunday but not delivered until a later day. In the case of Foreman vs.
Ahl, 55 Pa. 325, cited to us by the appellee, the defendant bought from
the plaintiff fifteen mules on Sunday and gave his note therefor on Sunday, but two of the mules were not delivered until Monday. Counsel
filed a written agreement that the cause should be considered at issue as
a suit on the note but that the plaintiff might, under his narr, offer any
evidence that would entitle him to recover either upon the note or upon
the common money counts in assumpsit.
Upon that state of the
pleadings, a recovery for the entire number of mules, fifteen, was reversed, the appellate court holding however, that, while the plaintiff
could not recover upon the note, he could recover in the common money
counts for the two mules delivered on Monday.
From this there is ample authority for holding that had the plaintiff
in the case at bar recovered upon an implied promise to pay the price of
the horse delivered on Tuesday the subsequent delivery of the horse was
the consummation of the contract commenced on Sunday, i. e. the contract for the sale of the horse. But we cannot hold that the subsequent
delivery of the horse consummated the execution of the note sued upon,
as that had been consummated on Sunday. And so, where a contract has
been fully consummated on Sunday, the courts will not lend their aid to
either party to enforce such a bargain. Accordingly, we are impelled to
the conclusion that, the note in suit and upon which recovery was had
having been executed and delivered on Sunday in violation of the act of
1794, the plaintiff cannot be permitted to recover thereon, unless there
has been such a subsequent ratification of the note as to warrant a finding that the contract was not fully consummated on that day. We are
unable to adopt the view that there has been such a ratification, although
Whitmire v. Montgomery, 165 Pa. 153, is apparently hostile to the conclusion we have reached. But it cannot be regarded as presenting such
insurmountable obstacles as to justify a repudiation of the long settled law of Pennsylvania upon contracts of this character. In that case
a judgmcnt note had been executed on Sunday and judgment entered
thereon, and, on opening judgment, that was set up as a matter of defence. The holder of the note offered evidence that there had been a
ratification of the note by the maker by a subsequent payment of interest, and this was held properly admissible. In short, the case simply reiterates the old doctrine that to make a contract void because executed on
Sunday, it must have been fully consummated on that day, and to that
extent we are ready and willing to subscribe to the rule of the case.
But we are unwilling to permit that case to govern this one so as to
compel us to hold that the delivery of the horse on Tuesday was such a
ratification of the contract (the note made on Sunday) as to warrant a
c6nclusion that therefore the note was not fully consummated on Sunday.
The plaintiff in the case at bar could recover on the implied promise to
pay for the horse, because, in so doing, he is not compelled to rely on the
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illegal Sunday contract, but the plaintiff cannot recover on the note (the
very contract which is tainted with illegality because made on Sunday)
on the ground that a subsequent delivery of the horse ratified a contract which before was illegal and void. A contract made on Sunday is
not merely voidable, but void, and is therefore incapable of satisfaction.
Without denying that Whitemyer v. Montgomery supra., may be law as
far as the case goes, we will not grant it force beyond the very decision
rendered there, viz: that a judgment note executed ana delivered on Sunday may be so ratified by subsequent payments of interest as to bring it
without the act of 1774. In any event, we do not regard it as binding us
to allow a recovery on the note in this case.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
The possibility of ratifying a Sunday contract, is recognized by the
decisions. Whitmire v. Montgomery; 165 Pa. 253; Cook v. Forker, 193
Pa. 461; Uhler v. Applegate, 26 Pa. 140. The contract made on Sunday to sell the horse was unenforceable, but the vendee's note for the price
was at once delivered, and on the next Tuesday the vendor delivered and the vendee accepted the horse. Was this delivery
such ratification of the whole contract, and of the note, as a part of
it, as to render the note enforceable? If the maker of the note had recognized its obligation on a secular day, had, e. g. paid the'interest upon
it, he would have made the whole note valid. 165 Pa. 253, supra. If A
on Sunday agrees with B, his debtor, to give him a longer time for the
payment of the debt, if B pays him $160, his acceptance of the $160 on a
week-day, makes his agreement to extend the time binding upon him;
26 Pa. 140. Why then should not Pierson's acceptance of the horse on
Tuesday make binding the promissory note which he had issued on Sunday?
With this result however, it would be hard to harmonize a dictum in Cook
v. Forker, 193 Pa. 461, where A, agreeing (by delivery of a check) to
pay on a secular day the amount of a note less the discount on the note's
being transferred to him on Sunday, the actual payment of the amount,
on a week day, was said not to make the note enforceable, but to create
a new contract to repay the money obtained on the check.
We should be inclined to think that when Pierson accepted the horse
on Tuesday, he sufficiently ratified the note which he had given on Sunday, except for this case and for that of Foreman v. Ahl, 55 Pa, 325.
The latter case holds that the delivery on Monday of two horses in part
execution of a contract made on Sunday, is not such a ratification of the
latter, as imparts validity to it. The delivery on Monday is as respects
the horses delivered, anew contract.
The judgment is therefore affirmed.
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JOHN MORRISON v. WILLIAM KELLOGG.
Evidence.

Adnmissions by a Party to the Record.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Trespass for injury to Morrison from the defects of its machinery
which he was operating in the works of Kellogg. Plaintiff offered the
statement of Kellogg as to the condition of the machinery and the mode
in which the injury occurred. As he was not present in the works for
six month before and had no personal knowledge therefore of the state
of the machinery, Kellogg objected to the use of his statement as mere
hearsay and inference. The court excluded this evidence. Motion for
new trial.
HAUER for Plaintiff.
JONES for Defendant.

OPINION OF COURT.
BROWN, J. -The question in this case is whether the declaration of
Kellogg should have been admitted as evidence against him. It was argued that, since Kellogg was not present in the works for six months prior
to the accident and therefore, had no personal knowledge of the condition
of the machinery, his declaration was not admissable. We think this argument is the only reasonable one. Declarations of a person made at
any time against his interest are admissible in evidence against him.
Such declarations of a party are generally stronger evidence than his declarations in his own favor and are to be taken as true and construed
most strongly against him. But the declaration must be as to a fact or
facts in relation to a matter concerning which the declarant was immediately and personally cognizant.
In an action against a passenger railway company [Lombard and S.
St. Pass. Ry. Co. vs. Christian, reported in 124 Pa. 114] to recover damages for personal injuries suffered by plaintiff, due to the alleged negligence of a driver, the latter testified that he had been discharged immediately after the accident, and that he had seen the president of the company about it. As to this interview, he was allowed, under objection by
the company, to testify in cross-examination, by plaintiff: "He asked
me why I was discharged and I said on account of an old lady falling from
my car, and he says; you had better say an old lady thrown from your
car'
Held, error; that the declarations made by the president, that officer not having been present, and having no personal knowledge of the
facts of the occurrence, was not an admission either that the accident was
the result of driver's negligence, or of any negligence at all; being at
best, merely an opinion of his own derived from the information of others
It could therefore have no element of original testimony, nor of any legitimate substitute for it.
In the case of Baker vs. Allegheny V. R. Co., 95 Pa. 211, the offer
was to show a declaration of the defendant company's superintendant,
made after the accident occurred, that the rope which caused the accident was unsafe. It was held that unless it appeared that the superin-
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tendant had had a personal knowledge of the rope, and that the declaration was to the effect that he knew before the accident that the rope was
unsafe, his declaration of opinion that it was unsafe was inadmissible.
It was held to be error, in the case of Steamship Co., vs. Landreth,
102 Pa. 131, in an action by a passenger against a steamship company to
recover damages for an injury sustained on board vessel, to admit the
declaration of the captain of the vessel made to the plaintiff and to another passenger immediately after the accident, that the place where it
occurred was a very dangerous part of the ship, and that he would have
it remedied immediately, for the reason in part, that it was a mere expression of opinion orr the part of the master.
As cited by the defendant in this motion, Greenleaf on Evidence, §148
states, "The ground on which this evidence is received is the extreme
improbability of its falsehood. The regard which men usually pay to
their own interests is deemed a sufficient security, both that the declarations were not made under any mistake of fact or want of information on
the part of declarant, if he had the requisite means of knowledge, and
that the matter declared was true."
It is essential to relevancy in the declaration that the declarant should
have adequate knowledge on the subject covered by his statements.
Mohaska Co. vs. Ingalls, 16 Iowa 81.
In this case the admission of Kellogg could not be binding because
he had no knowledge of the condition of the machinery and hence knew
nothing to which he could testify. What Kellogg said could be, at the
best, merely an opinion of his own derived from information attained
outside his own personal knowledge and hence could have no element of
original testimony or of any legitimate substitute for it.
We, therefore, refuse to grant a new trial for the reasons above
stated.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
It is a well settled general principle that the admissions of a party to
the record are, as against him, receivable in evidence. Wilson v. Wilson
137 Pa. 269. 1 A. & E. Ency. 269. Such admissions are received primarily because they tend to discredit the party's present claim by exhibiting
his inconsistency in other utterances. It is their inconsistency with the
party's present claim that gives them logical force and not their testimonial credit as assertions of fact. It follows that it is immaterial
whether the utterances offered as admissions would have been independently receivable as the testimony of a qualified witness or not. The offerer of an admission does not necessarily assert that it is true but uses
it to discredit the party's present claim by showing the inconsistency of
previous utterances. In accordance with these principles it is held that
the admissions of a party to the record are competent evidence whether
based upon personal knowledge or not.
In Chapman v. R. R. Co. 26 Wis. 295, it is said: "It is not necessary
that admissions to be received in evidence should be as to facts within
the knowledge of the party making them. They may be made upon information received from others and still be evidence against the party
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making them." To the same effect are Kitchen v. Robbins, 29 Ga. 713;
Sparr v. Wellman, 11 Mo. 280; Shaddock v. Clifton, 22 Wis. 165; Reed v.
McCord, 160 N. Y. 330; Stone v. Stone 191 Mass. 119; Koeslerv. Rochester Co. 194 N. Y. 92; Wasey v. Ins. Co. 126 Mich 119; Elliott on Evidence
222, 1 A. and E. Ency. 713, Wigmore on Evidence §1653.
This rule is not unfair to the party who made the admission. He is
a competent witness and may explain the circumstances under which the
admission was made. It may be presumed that the jury knowing all the
facts will take the admission for just what it is worth. Chapman vs. R.
R. Co. 26 Wis. 295; Shaddock v. Clifton 22 Wis. 165.
The quotations from Greenleaf on Evidence cited in the brief of
counsel for the defendant and in the opinion of the court below have no
bearing on the present case. These statements were made by Greenleaf
in discussing "declarations against interest" and not "admissions."
Declarations against interest are admitted in evidence as having independent assertive value after the manner of ordinary testimony, It i%
proper therefore, that they should be received only when uttered by one
having knowledge of the facts. Admissions, on the other hand, are received primarily because of their inconsistency with the party's present
claim, irrespective of their credit as assertions. In Bird v. Huston 10
Ohio St. 428, and Mohaska Co. v. Ingalls 16 Iowa 8], cited and relied
upon by the counsel for the defendant and the learned court below, the
declarations offered were the declarations of third persons against their
interest, and not admissions by a party to the record.
The Pennsylvania cases cited by the learned court below are not determinative of the present case nor is the doctrine here asserted inconsistent with the decisions in those cases. In each of those cases the declarations offered were not the declarations of a party to the record but
were declarations made by agents. It has frequently been decided that
declarations of an agent, while acting within the scope of his employment, in regard to a transaction depending at the very time, may be
given in evidence against the principal, but that declarations made after
the transaction to which they relate are not competent evidence against
the principal. Giberson v. Patterson Mill Co., 174 Pa. 369; Erie R" R. v.
Smith 120 Pa. 264; 1 A. & E. Encyc. 696 and Penna. cases there cited.
It is true that in some cases declarations of an agent, made subsequent to the occurrence to which they relate, if such declarations grow
directly out of it and are so immediately connected with it as to form part
of the very transaction itself, have been received in evidence. Hanover R. R. vs. Coyle, 55 Pa. 402.; Bigley vs. Williams, 80 Pa. 116. Such
declarations are not, however, admitted as admissions. They are admitted as "spontaneous exclamations" and would be admitted altho made
by an entire stranger. Coll vs. Transit Co., 180 Pa. 618. In order that
the declarations of any agent made immediately after the occurrence may
be admitted as a spontaneous exclamation it is, of course, necessary that
he should have personal knowledge of the facts to which the declaration
relates.
The Pennsylvania cases cited by the learned court below were correctly decided in accordance with these principles. They cannot, how-
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ever, be considered authorities for the proposition that declarations of a
party to the record are admissible only when based upon personal knowledge.
A careful reading of Folk vs. Schaeffer, 180 Pa. 613, cited by Wigmore as holding contrary to the doctrine here announced convincesus that
should the question under discussion be squarely presented to the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania they would take the same view that we have taken.
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. it.

TALBOT vs. ABINGER.
Trespass for Injuries.

Mental Suffering.

Measure of Damages.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Mrs. Talbot was a woman in poor health, suffering from a nervous
disorder that made it essential that she receive no sudden shock of any
kind. Abinger, fully knowing these facts, and maliciously planning to
do harm, called at the house of Mrs. Talbotin the absence of her husband,
asked to see Mrs. Talbot, and when admitted, told Mrs. Talbot that he
had just seeii her only child run down by a trolley car and killed. Mrs.
Talbot has become a hopeless lunatic as a result. This is an action of
trespass by Mr. Talbot. Plaintiff asks for damages first: for the plaintiff's loss of services and society of his wife; second: for damages
caused by the mental pain and anguish suffered by the plaintiff.
COHEN for Plaintiff.
BRUCE for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
KING, J.-This is an action of trespass by the husband to recover
damages for injury to his wife, caused by the defendant willfully and maliciously, with full knowledge of the nervous condition of Mrs. Talbot,
informing her that he had just seen her only child run down by a trolley
car and killed. Mrs. Talbot has become a hopeless lunatic as a result of
the shock.
There can be no recovery for the mental suffering in this case, unattended with any physical injury. Huston vs. Freemansburg Borough,
212 Pa. 548, is a case very similar in which Mitchell, C. J. said: "In the
last half century the ingenuity of counsel, stimulated by the cupidity of
clients and encouraged by the prejudices of juries, has expanded the action of negligence until it overtops all others in frequency and importance,
but it is only in the very end of that period that it has been stretched to
the effort to cover so intangible, so untrustworthy, so illusory and so
speculative a cause of action as mere mental disturbance.
"It requires but a brief judicial experience to be convinced of the
large proportion of exaggeration and even of actual fraud in the ordinary
action for physical injuries from negligence, and if we opened the door
to this new invention the result would be great damage, if not disaster
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to the cause of practical justice.

If therefore, the question were new,

we should see no reason to reach a different conclusion. But itis settled
for this state and is no longer open for discussion."'
The action was trespass to recover damages for the death of the
plaintiff's husband, the plaintiff claiming that the shock of a dynamite
explosion,-a negligent act of the defendant,-in excavating a hole in a
street, so affected the plaintiff's husband that he died from the effects
thereof two weeks later.
But while the plaintiff in this case cannot recover for mental suffering, he is entitled to such damages as will compensate him for loss of
services and loss of society of the wife, and for expenses already actually incurred and all those which may legitimately follow, because of the
disability of the wife,-this because the act was intentional and malicious on the part of the defendant, while wholly free from contributory
negligence on the part of the wife.
The damages here awarded are those only which are and will be actually suffered by the plaintiff and which can be readily ascertained by the
jury. While the rule in England as decided by Wilkinson vs. Downton
(1897), and the decisions in many of the American states allow a recovery for mental suffering alone, we believe it to be otherwise in Pennsylvania-as stated in 212 Pa. 548 supra, and the cases there collected.
Judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff in accordance with this
opinion.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
The act of Abinger was not negligent, but malicious. He saw in the
poor health of Mrs. Talbot, an opportunity to do harm. He "planned"
to do harm. He selected, as the means of doing it, a false reporttoher,
that he had just seen her only child killed. The result of this report has
been that Mrs. Talbot is a "hopeless lunatic."
The action is not by Mrs. Talbot, but by her husband. The hopeless
lunacy of the wife as fully deprives him of her services and society, as
her death. On the other hand it entails on him a special expense in furnishing a perpetual nurse or watch over her. That the husband may
recover for the loss of the society of the wife is indisputable. Such recovery is in part for the mental suffering arising daily from his bereavement.
Although the wife is entitled to her earnings, when she labors for
another, Rhodes' Appeal 156 Pa. 337; Nuding vs. Urich 169 Pa. 289; the
husband properly recovers compensation for the value of the services
which, as wife, she would probably have rendered to him, but for the injury. Reagan vs. Harlan, 24 Super. 27.
The mental state of the wife not only makes her unable to be a source
of aid or comfort to him; but it makes her a constant charge; it deprives
him of many social advantages; it produces daily mortification, chagrin
and sorrow. The learned court below has spent a large portion of its
opinion upon the proof that there is no right to compensation for mental
pain. It may be said of the cases cited, that they are all cases where the
injury was the result of negligence, not of malice. It might be that in the
former there should be no liability for "mental pain," while it would be
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proper to allow such liability in the latter cases. When a man purposely
affrights a woman, with the intention to "do harm," the courts ought
not to be astute to invent limitations to the compensation which he shall
be required to make.
Recovery for mental pain, chagrin, the sense of disgrace and humiliation is not unknown to the law. In actions for seduction of wife or
daughter, it is allowed: Phelin vs. Kenderdine, 20 Pa. 354; Millikin vs.
Long, 188 Pa. 411; Hoffman vs. Kemerer, 44 Pa. 452; 1 Sedgwick, Damages, 69. A father may obtain compensation in an action for the seduction of his daughter, for "his suffering of mind," "his disgrace and dishonor," his "wounded feelings," "the loss of the comfort and consolation that he had the right to feel in the purity and virtue of his child,"
"for the loss of hope in the future of his daughter," " for his mortification, humiliation and sense of dishonor." Millikin vs. Long, supra.
In libel, or slander, compensation may be given for "lacerated feelings"
Palmer vs. Publishing Co. 7 Super. 594. For the
for the "outrage."
chagrin and mortification arising from disfigurement, compensation may
be obtained. Rockwell vs. Eldred, 7 Super. 95.
An objection to the allowance of compensation for "mental pain"
seems to be that the existence of it may not always be ascertainable;
and that, in any case the degree and duration of it could not be with any
certainty discovered. "Mental suffering" says Fell, J., "presents no
features by which a court or jury can determine either its existence or
extent, and claims founded on it have generaily been regarded as too unLinn vs. Dusquesne Boro.
certain and speculative for consideration."
204 Pa. 551. But much the same could be said of so-called "physical
pain." All pain is in a true sense mental. It cannot be seen or felt by
another than the patient. Another may imagine from his own experience, or from that of others, what must be the pain attendant upon a
broken arm, or a burn, or a stab. But the opinion is speculative. Another may imagine how he would feel if his wife or daughter were debauched; or if some scandalous libel were published about him. The
ordinary juror could just as well discover how he would feel daily and
weekly, if he had to live with an insane wife, who, instead of being an
aid and comfort to him, was a constant care and encumbrance; who, instead of aiding him to maintain agreeable social relations, made the
maintenance of such relations impossible.
It would not be creditable to the law if it allowed a man maliciously
to "plan" harm by frightening a weak woman with the false report of the
death of her only child, and excused him, after she had been driven insane by his cruel falsehood, from liability to the husband for the constant
mental suffering, the humiliation, the disgrace, the social and other inconveniences arising from the insanity of his wife. They are no more easy
to feign, than the pain of the father of a seduced daughter; or the chagrin of the victim of a cruel defamation. Insanity is a visible and lasting fact, and the effect of it, in a wife, on the feelings of a husband from
day to day and week to week can be as accurately appraised as the socalled "physical pain" which is the effect of a cut, or of the fracture of
a limb.
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The cases upon the subject of recovery for "mental pain" are not
nearly so satisfactory as it could be hoped that they were. In Huston
vs. Freemansburg Borough, 212 Pa. 548, Mitchell, C.J., denied the existence of sufficient evidence that the defendant was negligent. He denied also, that the negligence, if any, [in blasting with dynamite] was the
proximate cause of the injury [the death in two weeks, of plaintiff's husband, on account of the shock, he recovering from typhoid fever, when
the shock occurred]. The Chief Justice says that the case has been reargued in order to "finally settle" that "there can be no recovery of damages from fright or other merely mental suffering unconnected with physical injury." But death surely was a physical injury, and that death
may not result from a shock occasioned by a sudden and loud detonation,
apart from any emotion of fear that it may awaken, it would be foolish
judicially to affirm. The Chief Justice apparently assumes that all that
appeared in the case was "so intangible, so untrustworthy, so illusory and
so speculative a cause of action as mere mental disturbance." What was
alleged to exist was, a sudden and surpising loud explosion; a very weak
man convalescing from typhoid fever, his consequent death. Of mental
disturbance nothing is said. But, if it had been, is it a novelty in
human experience that a loud noise, the report of an important fact,
pleasant or unpleasant, may cause death? What Mrs. Huston was seeking, was not compensation for the mental disturbance of her husband,
but for his death, and, surely somebody ought to be permitted to say
whether the disturbance caused by an explosion is mental or not, and
whether, even if mental it is the cause of a death. Perhaps the evidence
that a death delayed for two weeks was produced by the shock was not
adequate, but, while that fact would justify refusing to submit the question, it would be no excuse for adopting a principle that no death, caused
by the shock of an explosion, that is, caused by a "mere mental disturbance," would be a ground of action.
This case refers to Fox vs. Borkey, 126 Pa. 164, as "really" deciding
that there can be no recovery for damages from fright or other merely
mental suffering, unconnected with physical injury. We look in vain
for this principle in the case. Justice Mitchell declaring that there was
no reason for permitting a recovery [injury for shock from blasting
rocks], particularizes thus; there was no negligence; the injury was not
the proximate result; the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence.
The justice found no sufficient evidence that the explosion would "concuss the spine of a woman 80 yards off." Not a word is said about the
unrewardableness of "mental suffering," or of fear.
Ewing vs. Railway Co., 147 Pa. 40, is next referred to in 212 Pa. 548.
A collision of cars hurled one of them against the house, wherein the
plaintiff, a woman, was, subjecting her [as she alleged] to alarm,
nervous excitement and sickness; and to great physical and mental pain,
to permanent weakening and disablement. The trial court sustained the
defendant's demurrer to the declaration, The supreme court endorses
the action of the trial judge, saying that there was no allegation of any
bodily injury. "If mere fright, unaccompanied with bodily injury, is a
cause of action, the scope of what are known as accident cases will be
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very greatly enlarged, for in every case of a collision on a railroad, the
passengers, although they have sustained no bodily harm, will have a
cause of action against the company for the "fright" to which theyhave
-been subjected." "We know," says the court again, "of no well-consid
ered case in which it has been held that mere fright when unaccompanied
by some injury to the person, has been held actionable." Such observations are wanting in relevancy. The action was not for "mere fright;"
for "mere fright unaccompanied with bodily injury". The declaration
states distinctly that the claim is for continued sickness and disability to
do work, for permanent weakness. It alludes to the fright as the cause
of this condition and asserts that the fright was itself the effect of the
collision; and that the collision was the result of negligence. The doctrine, asserted by the decision though not by the opinion, is that there
can be no recovery for sickness. disorganization of the nervous system,
etc., if it is immediately superinduced by terror. Another principle supposed decisive of the case, is that the injury was not the probable and
proximate effect of the collision.
In Linn vs. Dusquesne Borough, 204 Pa. 551, a woman fell into an
opening in a street, breaking both her wrists. A permanent injury to
the hands resulted The judgment for the woman was reversed because
the damages allowed her ($2,000) embraced besides compensation for pain
and disablement, indemnity for the humiliation and regret she would
feel, because of her being unable to attend to her household duties. Fell,
J., does not commit himself to the doctrine that there can be no compensation for mental pain. On the contrary, he concedes that "where a
claim is for mental suffering that grows out of or is connected with a
physical injury, however slight, there is some basis for 'determining its
genuineness, and the extent to which it affects the claimant." For the
pain arising from disfigurement, for the chagrin springing from physical
disablement, damages have been allowed. The physical disablement is a
visible fact. What its permanent effect on the mind would be can be as
well perceived by courts and juries, as a thousand other facts which are
conceded to be within their competence. We have already suggested
that juries in seduction cases, in defamation cases, consider the effect on
the peace of mind of the plaintiff, of the seduction or the libel. When a
passenger is wrongly ejected from a train, he is compensated for the insult. 1 Sedgwick Damages, 67. So in actions for malicious prosecutions,
false imprisonment, assault and battery. In actions for bodily injury,
compensation may be given for "the mortification which the plaintiff has
suffered and will suffer, by reason thereof, and of the fact that he
may become an object of curiosity and ridicule among his fellows." Ibid.
It would be extremely unfortunate, if the distrust of the courts, one
branch of the judicatures of the country, for juries, another branch
thereof, should lead to the establishment of the principle that so-called
"mental suffering," cannot be compensated, even in the face of evidence
of the existence of objective facts which would very probably awaken it,
and at the same time, would reasonably define its quality and its degree.
The effect of Abinger's act was the insanity of Talbot's wife. That
is apparently undisputed. What the effect of this would be on the feel
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ings of Talbot, the ordinary jury is fully competent to estimate. It would
be a gross miscarriage of justice to allow Abinger maliciously to inflict
this suffering, without exacting compensation for it from him.
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.

WM. POTTER v. BOROUGH OF CARLISLE.
Borough Ordinance.

Swinging Signs.

Nuisance.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
For many years merchants in Carlisle have maintained swinging
signs hanging over the side-walks. Potter, a merchant, a year ago, put
such a sign before his premises, at considerable expense. This sign was
somewhat larger than signs generally and was gaudily and offensively
painted. The borough council passed an ordinance requiring all swinging
signs to be taken down within three months by the owner and if he neglect to do so, requiring the street officers to remove them at the expense of the owner. This is a bill in equity to enjoin against the enforcement of the ordinance.
BUCKLEY for Plaintiff.
LOKUTA for Defendant.
ORCUTT, J.-Tlie facts are agreed to and stated in the arguments
of the counsel. This bill is by the owner of a sign to enjoin the borough
from enforcing an ordinance which declares that all swinging signs shall
be removed within three months by the owner thereof and if he
neglect to do so, by the street officer at the owner's expense. I am
clearly convinced, by the decisions in equity and law, that this ordinance
cannot be enforced.
The only cause, that I see, for the enforcement of such an ordinance
is that such signs are nuisances. I am unable to account for the distinction, drawn by the ordinance, between swinging signs and signs
which have a permanent position. The erection and maintenance of signs
seems to be a custom, sanctioned by the usage of many hundred years.
By permitting these signs to be used during all the former years, the
borough impliedly acknowledged that such are not nuisances.
The ordinance was not directed against this one sign as being a nuisance, on account of its size, gaudiness, and offensive painting, but it was
directed against all swinging signs. If against one sign of a certain size,
which exceeded the reasonable limit, the borough could have enforcedthe
ordinance; if against all swinging signs without any limit, it was unreasonable.
Boroughs have the power to permit, under regulations that are reasonable in character, and general in their application, the use of a portion of the highway for ornamental work upon buildings, (door steps, awnings, cornices, projecting windows, signs, etc.) standing on the street line.
136 Pa. 519. Whether an ordinance is invalid because of its unreasonableness or for any other cause is generally a question for the court. I
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am satisfied, for the following reasons, that the said borough exceeded
their authority in passing the ordinance and that said ordinance was unreasonable; (1) it declared all swinging signs nuisances, which is contrary to custom and policy; (2) it distinguished between swinging and
stable signs; (3) it was injurious to business and the public; (4) it was
not authorized by the legislature, but was in effect just contrary to the
provisions of the act of March 30, 1865, which requires every partnership
firm to erect on the outside of its place of business, some sign; (5) because of the loss of property without any apparent gain or benefit; (6) it
made no distinction between large and small signs; (7) Because some
signs do not interfere with the use and value of adjoining property or the
right of passage along the highway; (8) because there is no apparent
advantage, necessity, or convenience of such an ordinance.
If all such signs were unreasonably offensive they would come within
the meaning of the act of April 3, 1851. Therefore if Potter's sign was offensive the legislature gives the borough authority to abate it as a nuisance. Are all signs offensive matter?
What would be a reasonable ordinance depends upon the circumstances, as will be seen by the conflicting decisions. 100 Pa., 182, and
5 Pa. C. C. 1. Streets are necessarily used for signs, etc. 35 Pa. 284, but
these structures are subject to municipal regulation. In the case of
signs where there is no regulation as to a limit, it will be assumed that
any size is lawful and so it is, until regulated by ordinance, or until it
comes within the Act of April 3, 1851.
The master in 136 Pa. 519, found that it was the custom of the borough of Carlisle to permit jut windows, balconies, awnings, and signs
extending across the foot walk, to remain permanently in the street. At
common law corporations have power to make by-laws for the general
good. They must be reasonable, and for the common benefit, not in restraint of trade, nor imposing a burden without an apparent benefit. 12
Pa. 321. It is not a nuisance simply to shut out a pleasant prospect, or
to erect disagreeable objects in view.-Bispham's Equity Sec. 441, 61
Mich. 63. 95 Pa. 287 held that the right to partially obstruct a street is
not limited to a case of strict necessity: it may be extended to purposes
of convenience or ornamentation provided it does not reasonably interfere with public travel. Ordinances must be reasonable and must be upon
the subjects authorized by law.-123 Pa. 151. In view of these cases and
the foregoing reasons it is plain that the ordinance in this case was unreasonable and void.
If this sign of Potter's was a nuisance, which is a question for a jury
and not for a judge, it is certain that it could be abated; 100 Pa. 182.
The sign being lawfully erected, and the borough having exceded its
authority by passing the ordinance, I am of opinion that it cannot be
enforced and the bill must therefore be sustained.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
A borough, like corporations generally, has the powers which have
been conferred upon it. Boroughs in Pennsylvania, have power "tQ regstreets * * and they shall have all other needful jurisulate *
diction over the same"; power to "prohibit and remove any obstructions
in the highways of the borough, and any nuisance or offensive matter,
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whether in the highways or in public or private ground, etc. " and "to make
such other regulations as may be necessary for the health and cleanliness of the borough."
Under these and similarly phrased powers, boroughs have regulated
cellar doors, pilasters, jut and bay windows, porches, and other projections beyond the building line into the streets. There is no good reason
for denying to them the power to control awnings, or signs hanging
transversely over the sidewalks. In various ways hanging signs might
be an obstruction to walking. They may hang too low. They may be
loosened by the wind or weather, and fall. Their swinging to and fro
may tend to frighten horses. The danger of their falling may awaken
fear even in the minds of pedestrians, and so incommode and obstruct
them. Their occasional actual falling may inflict injury upon them. They
obstruct the view, and lessen the beauty of the streets. These are considerations that justify regulation or even suppression.-Cf. Phila. v.
Brabender, 201 Pa. 574, where the defacing of the streets with loose
paper, is mentioned as one of the justifications for prohibiting the casting
into the streets, or doors, of hand bills, etc.
It is quite possible that some hanging signs are so secure, so small,
executed in such good taste, as not to call for repression, yet the difficulty of discriminating between them and less tolerable signs might be
so serious, as to require that all should be permitted or forbidden. The
discretion is placed, in the first place, with the councils whom the people
of the borough elect. They probably understand the needs and wishes
of the inhabitants, the convenience or inconvenience of swinging signs,
better than any one person, who may be called a judge. It is true that
judges do sit as a quasi court of appeal upon the ordinances of council,
but only a clear case would warrant the court's annulment of legislation
passed by the body primarily vested with regulative power.
The sign of the plaintiff was large, and was gaudily and offensively
painted. Other signs may be open to the same objection. The borough
is not required to tolerate unsightly objects flung across its pavements,
and it may be impracticable to prevent these, without preventing all transverse signs whatever. Of this impracticability the council is the primary judge. The court should not too lightly assume that it can form a
wiser or juster opinion upon such matters than it.
The suggestion is made" that the borough of Carlisle has long tolerated such signs. But the town has grown larger. It is becoming more
and more civilized. Years ago nuisances, dangerous to health were suffered on account of the ignorance of the principles of sanitation, that
in a better instructed age would not be tolerated. Governments may
become more efficient with years, widening the scope of their restraining
activity. There is no vested right in the plaintiff, in the continuance of
the privilege of obstructing and deforming the street.-St. Louis v Theatre Co., 202 Mo. 690; Hibbard v. Chicago, 173 Ill. 91.
On the general subject see Ivins v. Trenton, 68 N. J. L. 501; Sands v.
Trenton, N. J. L. 57 Atlan 267; Small v. Edenton, 146 N. C. 527; 20 L.
R. A. (N. S.) 145; Augusta v. Burum, 26 L. R. A. 340; Hagerstown v.
Witmer, 39 L. R. A. 667.
A view of the streets of the borough, erowded as some of them are,
with large pendant boards, variously charactered, convinces us that the
discretion of the council has not been foolishly, oppressively, illegally
exercised.
Deeree reversed and bill dismissed.

